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This is an appeal from an order disallowing a creditor's a proceeding. It 
involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate recovery, as in Idaho 
Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program, required by federal law and by state statute 
and rules, that seeks to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients to reimburse state and 
federal treasuries for medical payments made on their behalf during their lives. matter involves a 
claim filed by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the "Department") the 
estate of a deceased Medicaid recipient and her spouse. 
Course of Proceedings 
The personal representative was appointed on May 22,2009. R. p. 2. Department was 
first notified of this matter upon receipt of the personal representative's Petition for Approval of 
Settlement filed November 16,2009. 1 R. p. 8. The Department immediately filed a Claim Against 
Estate (R. p. 13), a Demand for Notice (R. p. 16), and an Objection to Final Settlement (R. p. 18). 
The personal representative then filed a Notice of Disallowance of Claim. R. p. The Department 
a Petition for Allowance of Claim, as required to preserve its rights by Idaho Code § lS-3-806(a). 
hearing held on February 3,2010, on the Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim, mid 
on March 30,2010, Judge Frates issued his Memorandum Decision Denying Claim 
Against The Department filed a Notice of Appeal the an April 7, 2010. 
lIdaho Code a the of his 
or her appointment within 30 not occur in this case. 
s - 1 Z:\1vL","CaseslEsmteIWCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Courtv\ppellaIl!S Brief.wpd 
on re: and 
fees and attorney to 
Code § 12-117. On 10, the court "'TI1"pr<'" Order on Attorney Fees, denying 
attorney fees requested pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. Oral argument on appeal to the District 
Court was held on February 8,2011, and the District Court's Memorandum Decision on Appeal was 
filed July 20,2011. 
Statement of the Facts 
Vivian and Emerson Wiggins were u,-<,-,vu,uu and 2002, when Vivian was 90 years old, 
she needed nursing care and entered the nursing horne. R. p. 36. Emerson applied for Medicaid 
benefits to assist in paying Vivian's nursing home costs, and Medicaid was approved effective 
September 1,2003. R. p. 36. There is some question as to this was accomplished. After the 
death of both Vivian and Emerson in 2009, Emerson was in possession of$78,508.59 in cash assets. 
R. p. 22. The personal representative asserted these funds were the residue of the couple's community 
property which had been transmuted into Emerson's separate property through a marriage settlement 
agreement when Vivian's Medicaid eligibility was being in 2002. A married person can 
have no more than $3,000 in countable resources (such as to qualify for HH''"'''''~U.'''''. IDAPA 
16.03.05.201. While no marriage settlement gn~enleIl[ was ever found, by determining that Vivian 
was eligible Medicaid 2003, as if she ans:lerreo almost all of 
countable resources to 
must existed it assets to rn"''''''r,,,, sometime in R. 117. 
s -2 Z:IMRCasesIEstateIWCC\WCC Open Cases\Wigginsv~,Supreme Courtv\ppellants Briefwnd 
L'-'UJlVvL 1, the 
l34.68 on behalf of 14. ---'--J 30, 
at age R. p. 37. died less than two weeks later on 9,2009. R. 
7. was 98 years old. 
probate and Emerson was opened on May 22, 2008. R. p. 2. Joint probate is 
permitted community has been dissolved by the death of either spouse at any time, 
entitled to all of the property of the decedent by will, law, or both, and the 
died proceeding had been commenced for the probate of the estate of the spouse 
death occurred first .... " Idaho Code § 15-3-111. Therefore, because Vivian died first, all of 
Vivian's assets passed to Emerson either by operation of law or through the presumed marriage 
settlement agreement. 
The inventory showed assets of$78,508.59 in "C.D.'s, Notes and Cash." 
s Z:\lvfRCases\,.Sstate\WCC\V/CC 8p:m Cases\WIgginsV\SupTer~e Court\.4ppeliants B:def.wpd 
1. 
218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against assets had been '-'VJcLliJ,.lUJ.H 
had become the separate property of Emerson 
2. Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Ida..ho 
authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had 
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or 
I. 
JU."""1J."-'-' OF REVIEW 
As ..... L\.'J.ULLH..,U Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 563, 249 P.3d 362 
(2011): 
an appeal from the district court, acting in its appellate capacity, this Court: 
reviews the trial court (magistrate) record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings. If 
those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the 
district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we affirm the district court's 
decision as a matter of procedure. 
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1981), quoted in Doe 
v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 759-60, 53 P.3d 341, 342-43 (2002). 
Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho at 249 P.3d at 364-5. Moreover, as 
stated in Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006): 
When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity 
over the magistrate division, this Court reviews the magistrate court's decision 
independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's intermediate appellate 
decision. This Court will uphold the magistrate court's findings of fact if they are 
supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. 
Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho at 378,146 P.3d at 645. there are no genuine issues of fact, the Court 
freely reviews the Welfare, 150 Idaho 
742, 746 
Z:\MRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Courtv\Dpellants Briefwpd 
BELOW 
court disallowed the Department's claim against the joint estate. Judge 
could not recover from Emerson Wiggins's separate property, even 
nrr\np1'1>;r had once been the couple's community property. This conclusion seems to 
of Judge Frates's view that the Idaho legislature intended to allow couples to avoid 
to Medicaid by executing a marriage settlement agreement: 
Marriage Settlement Agreements are recognized under Idaho law and require 
specific statutory compliance 32-916 et. Seq. An MSA allows one spouse to transmute 
community property to the other. Furthermore, the Idaho legislature contemplated that 
transfers could be made by recipients of Medicaid and/or their spouses without 
compensation in order to avoid repayment. 
Me~mc~rarldum Decision Denying Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate, p. 6 (emphasis added) (R. p. 
12 
While the briefing and argument before Judge Frates had included discussion of federal 
preemption and the case of In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008) cert. denied sub nom Vas 
" v. 129 S.Ct. 2859, 174 L.Ed.2d 576 (2009), Judge Frates's decision does not mention or 
discuss 1"Wp'prrl1"Wl However, Conclusion of his decision, Judge Frates stated, "The Department 
recover against property the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her 
Petitioner's Lf"o~.'HU' the Estate, p. 7 (R. p. 
laH~U<:l.."''"' seems to be it is 
a 
-6 Z:\1vIRCases\Estate\'\f;,lCC\WCC Open Cases\Wiggins\'\Supreme Court\J\.ppeHants 
Trout believed Department c~HUU1U required to 
settlement agreements in order to recover property which had S vV' .. U.H.LCUAHY property 
but was transmuted before death. In her view, Emerson's separate property assets were available for 
recovery, but only if the Department first voided the marriage sernelne:m aJcre:enlerlL In her discussion 
of the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h), Judge Trout stated: 
That provision, which is difficult to understand at best, broadens what should be 
included in the recipient's estate and appears to include resources which the recipient 
would have had in his or her estate but for the actions of the recipient or recipient's 
spouse. While this would appear to include property transmuted by virtue of an MSA 
as the Department argues, there is nothing in the statute that makes this happen 
automatically. In other words, simply because the definition of "assets" could include 
that property doesn't mean that such transactions are set aside "Jjthout further action. 
There should be some action taken to recover those resources into the recipient's 
estate. such as setting aside the MSA, which will be discussed later in Decision. 
* * * 
... Some action should be required in order for those resources to be included and 
I.C. § 56-218(2) is the vehicle for doing so. 
Memorandum Decision on Appeal, pp. 11, 13 (R. pp. 437,439). Judge Trout understood that such a 
set-aside action would have been impossible in this case because of the statute oflimitations. 
Memorandum Decision on Appeal, p. 13 (R. p. 439). However, she felt that was a defect 
statute that could be corrected by the Legislature. Id 
Z:\h1RCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme CourtV'.ppellams Briefwpd 
§ PERMITS RECOVERY 
OF EITHER SPOUSE OR BOTH, WITHOUT 
REGARD TO THE ASSETS WOULD BE 
CHARACTERIZED AS COMMlJNITY OR SEPARATE. 
Idaho Code § 56-218 aut.hOl·lZc~S recovery from the estate of both the Medicaid recipient and 
her spouse: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance vvith federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five 
(55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may be 
recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, ~~~~~ 
paid to either or both; 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline _~~. __ , Nothing in the statute limits this recovery to property 
characterized as community or separate property. It is clear and unambiguous. Likewise, Department 
rules make confirm that separating a assets through a marriage settlement agreement will not 
vitiate the Department's estate recovery claim against the estate of the spouse: 
05. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets for a 
married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of the deceased 
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or other 
such agreement may be voided not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07) 
IDAPA 16.03.09.905.05 (underline 2 Department's rules have the same force and effect 
as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 61 84 P.3d 551,555 (2004). 
the below this rule was cited as ID.A.P A 16.03.09.900.24. Trout believed that this 
and the other rule cited here, ID"A.PA 16.03.09.905.01, cited below as Rule were deleted in 2010. 
Memorc.ndum Decision on Appeal, p. 9 (R. p. is incorrect. These rules were simply renumbered. 
s - 8 Z:\lvf<-_RCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Court\Appeliants Brief.'~j 
assets had previously held ati 
01. Limitations on Estate Claims. * * * A claim against the estate of a 
spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the assets of the estate that had been, at 
any time after October 1, 1993, community property, or the deceased participant's 
share of the separate property, and jointly owned property. * * *. 
16.03.09.905.01. This rule limits the Department's claim against the estate of the spouse to 
assets which had been community property, jointly owned assets, or property of the Medicaid recipient 
the effective date of OBRA '93,3 as required by this Court's decision in Idaho Department of 
and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 216, 970 P.2d 6,9 (1998). This is the date the 
states were authorized to adopt the expanded definition of "estate" found in 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(4). 
The rule does not expand, but rather limits, the application of Idaho Code § 56-218 to avoid federal 
preemption that could otherwise result, as discussed in Jackman. 
Idaho law permits recovery from the estate of either spouse, so long as the assets are traceable 
to the couple's community or jointly owned property, or the assets had been the property of the 
Medicaid recipient. Nothing in the law or rules otherwise limits recovery based on the final 
assets as separate or commupity. As discussed, below, it is this tracing of assets 
may have transferred to the spouse, that the Medicaid recovery law specifically intends. 
Reconciliation Act of I L. 103-66. 
-9 Z:\MRCases\Estate\\VCC\WCC Open Cases\Wiggin.sV\Supreme COll.l1:\;\ppellfu'1ts Brief.'Wpd 
A 
FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW, CHANGES PASS 
AWAY AND ESTATE RECOVERY 
Both the Magistrate and the District Court "',,-,,-,LU,",U that assets =~~ for purposes 
of determining Medicaid eligibility would suddenly be ===-= of Medicaid estate 
recovery. Indeed, Judge Frates thought that a marriage settlement greement would only serve its 
purpose if it allowed the couple to avoid estate recovery. See ",""""H'cn"""H,L',LLH Decision Denying 
Petitioner's Claim Against the Estate, p. 6 CR. p. 121). Likewise, felt that the Department 
should be required to bring a separate action to set-aside the marriage settlement agreement before 
recovery could be made. See Memorandum Decision on Appeal, pp. 1 ,13 pp. 437,439). 
However, excluding certain property for eligibility, but including same property for estate recovery 
is exactly what the law intends. 
As discussed by the Court in Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of Health 145 Idaho 530, 
181 P .3d 456 (2008), Medicaid eligibility for elderly couples involves complex rules allowing certain 
assets to be shifted from the spouse needing Medicaid eligibility to the Some 
assets, such as the couple's home, are "excluded" and not counted When, as 
permitted by the rules, assets are shifted to the non-Medicaid spouse, not 
counted, in determining the Medicaid spouse's eligibility. 
H""."-LV"'-LU recipient her spouse passed 
ret~erencc;;d above, assets 
are IS 
Z:\!vLRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Open Cases\Wigginsv'Supreme Cou:iAppeliants BriefwpC 
estate treatment asset 
OBRA '93 was "expanded 
§ 1 Also included were new definitions, including 
a sweeping clearly includes the property of the Medicaid recipient's spouse. 
definition is now at U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(1): 
term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of and of the individual's spouse, including any income or 
or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not 
receive because of 
by or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse, or 
(C) by person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.c. § 1396p(h)4 ~U_'~U.LUV added). This definition greatly increases the scope of estate 
recovery to include assets that had been shifted to the non-Medicaid spouse for purposes of Medicaid 
eligibility. 
Further revealing VHL,u.li",'-' in the treatment of a couple's assets after their death is the 
definition of .S.C. § 1396p(h)(5). "Resources," for purposes of eligibility, is 
defmed in 20 some qualifications, "cash or other liquid assets or any 
real or personal n"'E,,...~'rh any) owns and could convert to cash to be 
§ 1382b, provides certain exclusions to the 
of IS for 
definitions were found at subsectlon of 42 U.S,c. § 
Z:\1vfRCases\Estare\WCC\WCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme COUJ'L\..Ap?ellants Briei,'W'Pd 
from resources 
determining the resources an 
shall be excluded -
horne (including land that appertains .u,-",,",.v 
.S.c. § 1382b(a)(1). This is why, when determining Medicaid eligibility, s IS 
excluded. However, the definition of "resources" for purposes of estate recovery, found in 42 U 
§ 1396p(h)(5), specifically includes the family home: 
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1382b 
of this title, without reQ:ard ... to the exclusion described in subsection (a)(1) of such 
U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5) (underline added). These provisions in section 1396p show 
~~!.£ that assets excluded for eligibility be included for estate recovery. Recovery is made 
death of both the Medicaid recipient and the spouse, when the reason for shifting the assets in 
has ceased to exist. 42 U.S.c. § 1396p(b)(2). 
If these provisions in section 1396p are not clear enough by themselves, the intent of these 
changes enacted in OBRA '93 were clearly explained by the House Budget Committee as follows: 
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate recovery 
program that meets certain requirements. The program must identify and track 
resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) of individuals who 
receive nursing facility, home and community-based services, and other specified 
long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain when the individual and 
the surviving spouse, if anv, dies, and must provide for the collection of the amounts 
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from 
the estate of the individual or the surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as 
all and personal property of a deceased individual and all other assets which 
had fu'1y legally cognizable title or interest at the time 
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, 
1 51 2. 
Z:\1vfRCases\2state\WCC\VlCC Open Cases\WigginsV\Supreme Courtv\ .. ppeHams 
at out 
,",U.,:>ULH'-''-Ll provisions of 1 
Perhaps not coincidentally, Idaho's estate recovery statute was passed same year. This new estate 
recovery statute provided for recovery the estate of spouse: 
56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance. 
(1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf an individual 
who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when received such 
assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the estate of the 
surviving spouse, if anv, shall be charged for such aid paid to either or both .... 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (1988) (underline added). described "~n-r-T/H'r1 v. Idaho Dept. of 
Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 181 P.3d 456 (2008), protected the non-Medicaid 
spouse by assuring that he was able to have sufficient resources to provide for his own 
needs. However, the legislature seemed to recognize that mefult that the non-Medicaid spouse 
would have assets that had been shifted to him during the process, and that any of those assets 
remaining after both spouses had died should be recovered. it provided for recovery from 
the estate of the non-Medicaid spouse. 
The MCCA was intended to provide a benefit to 
there is nothing in the law, the rules, or the legislative 
dependent heirs were intended beneficiaries of this assistance. 
VLU'<H'.F, to transfers of assets to trusts Medicaid 
The rationale of the rule is 
from the home property 
home assistance. 
- 13 Z:\lvIRCases\Estate\\¥CC\WCC 
'-'-'-"cUvU-LU recipient and her spouse, 
that couple's non-
discussing the Department's rules 
recognized the clear ratlon.ale 
Cases\WigginsV,,-Supreme COllrtlAopeliants Brief.W1Jd 
at 8,181 P.3dat The estate are 
needs have 
VLL< ... .,.LU',." assets, no matter estate they may be found in. 
v. 
CLAIM FOR MEDICAID RECOVERY IS STATUTORY 
AND NOT BASED ON A CONTRACT WITH THE COUPLE. 
Underlying the decisions the courts below is the assumption that there was a contract for 
HL'~UL"'U.'U. benefits binding Vivian Wiggins, but not Emerson, and therefore, Emerson's 
separate property JU\JU.LU not be chargeable for Vivian's debt. Indeed, this assumption is demonstrated 
District s comment regarding Idaho Code § 32-912: 
There is in the record to indicate that Emerson signed in writing agreeing to bind 
separate property for the debts of Vivian. Vvlrile that may very well have been part 
of the Medicaid application process, it is not in the record. 
Memorandum on Appeal, p. 7 (R. p. 433). This underlying assumption, however, is 
incorrect. Applying Medicaid is not a commercial transaction. There is no bargained for exchange 
or quid pro quo. there are notices given to the couple, relating to estate recovery and other 
receIvmg ...'-''-'''''' ... ,,\..!., there is no contract or agreement for repayment. 
is entirely based on meeting the requirements of the relevant statutes 
IS on the statute, not on any contract or agreement. 
§ ) states: 
s - 4 Z:\IvfRCases\Estate\VICC\V\TCC Open Cases\\Viggins~V\Supreme Court\Appellants 3rief\-vpd 
exempted or 
chapter on 
or when the individual 
Code § 56-218(1). The sale precondition for is 
recipient reaches fifty-five years of age. 
An application for Medicaid may be made by someone who is an "authorized rpr.rP'"pnT'AT1 
or "someone acting responsibly for the applicant," rather than someone could legally enter a 
contract on behalf of the applicant. 42 C.F.R. § 435.907. For some who already receive federal 
benefits, no separate application for Medicaid is required. 42 C.F.R. § 435 These are 
clearly not designed to require applicants to contractually bind themselves to repay a debt. 
there is no enforceable "debt" until both spouses have passed away. Ida..'1o Code § 56-21 
There are potential remedies if a Medicaid recipient or her spouse transfers assets without adequate 
consideration. See e.g. Idaho Code § 56-218(2) (such transfers may be voidable) and 42 .S.C. § 
1396p( c) (eligibility penalties). However, there are no circumstances that repayment of correctly paid 
Medicaid can be demanded from a living spouse. There is no debt to the living Medicaid recipient or 
her non-Medicaid spouse. Rather, there is a statutory right to recover from estate alone. The 
is not a claim based on a contract, but solely on statute. 
As described in Stafford, both spouses are intimately involved process. 
145 Idaho at 534-6, 181 P.3d at 460-2 (discussing of the 
This process benefits both the HL'AU"'U.'",", the nOII-lV1CUlcaiO 
Z:\lvfRCases\Estate\WCC\WCC Oper: Cases\WlgginsV\Supreme Court\A ... ppellants Briefwpd 
sufficient 
income and resources spouse while also that a fair share of 
the couple's resources were the care of the institutionalized spouse. 
Stafford, 145 Idaho at 534,181 P.3d at 460 /¥1!nTTrtrT Cleary v. 167 F.3d 801,805 (3rd 
Cir.1999) cert. denied 528 U.S. 870, 120 S.Ct. 145 L.Ed.2d 144 (l Therefore, even if 
the Medicaid application process could be VleCL,wvU to a contract, it would be a contract in which 
both spouses participated and both spouses V~LLVH'~~'~' the separate property of the non-
Medicaid spouse would still be subject to YL'-",.uvc",,-< recovery "debt." Williams v. Paxton, 98 
Idaho 155, 162,559 P.2d 1123, 1130 (1 
The reality is, estate recovery is an remedy which is enforceable, not against 
the couple individually, but only against estates after they pass away. Other than the tracing of 
joint assets, as previously discussed, IS no v,-""",-.:>tv.u to determine whether the estate consists of 
community or separate property, 
It is for this same reason that it is urmecessary for the Department to seek to set-aside marriage 
settlement agreements, Those agreements serve a under Spousal Impoverisllment 
provisions to preserve assets for the non-Medicaid spouse. However, because recovery does not 
depend on the ultimate Cll,rra<;tel'lZcltlon couple's .,.,,..ryn,,,1"T<.T, it is not necessary to set aside the 
marriage settlement 
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Code § 56-218 permits recovery of the assets of this estate can 
characterized as community or separate property. The Department's claim should be allowed. 
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